Combined Metals v. State Tax Commission : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Combined Metals v. State Tax Commission : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
H. Van Dam; Cheney, Jensen, Marr & Wilkins; Farnworth & Van Cott; Ingebrestsen, Ray Rawlins &
Christensen; Attorneys for Respondents.
Unknown.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Combined Metals Reduction Company v. State Tax Commission, No. 6869.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/48
UTAH UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DOCUM;::NT 
KFU BRIEF 
45.9 
~~Cr\ET NO. (o8 q- ~~19 R_ 
INDEX 
Statement of the Case 
Argument 
1. The Subsidy or Premium Payments Received 
By Respondents from Metals Reserve Com-
pany Were No Part of the "Gross Amount 
Received For, or Gross Value of Metalliferous 
Page 
1 
Ore Sold" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
2. The Exaction of the Tax Herein Complained 
Of Was a Direct and Unconstitutional Inter-
ference with and Burden Upon the Functions 
of the National Government ................ 31 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
CASES CITED 
Alabama v. King and Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 86 L. Ed. 3 33 
Dupler Art Furs v. State Tax Commission, 
Utah, 161 P. (2d) 788 ........................ 22 
Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 38 S. C. 62 L. Ed. 211 18 
Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 
293 U. S. 84, 55 S. Ct. 50, 79 L. Ed. 211 ........ 19 
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 
82 L. Ed. 155 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51, 55; 41 S. Ct. 
16; 65 L. Ed. 126, 128 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
Klies v. Linnane, 156 P. (2d) 183 ................ 23-28 
Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. v. Richards, 
52 U. 1, 172 P. 474 .......................... 19 
McCulloch v. State of Maryland et al., 17 U. S. 159, 
4 Wheat 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 .................... 33 
Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 
U. S. 498, 52 S. C. 260, 76 L. Ed. 422 . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
INDEX- (Continued) 
Page 
Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 
97 P. (2d) 937, 126 A. L. R. 1318 ............ 19 
State v. Armson, (Minn.), 207 N. W. 732 ............ 22 
United States v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179, 44 S. C. 
69, 68 L. Ed. 240 ............................ 18 
Vause etc. v. McKibbin, 39 N. E. (2d) 1006 ........ 21-22 
W. F. Jensen Candy Company v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 90 Utah 359, 61 P. (2d) 629, 107 A. L. R. 
261 ......................................... 19 
REFERENCES AND AUTHORITIES 
Accu. Supp. Code of Fed. Reg. of U. S. A. p. 1070 6 
Am. Juris. Vol. 11, p. 870, Constitutional Law, Sec. 174 . 32 
Am. Juris. Vol. 51, p. 279, Taxation, Sec. 218 p. 279 .. 32 
Bouvier ......................................... 16 
Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 11, 4th Ed. Sec. 503 p. 1113 .. 19 
Laws of Utah 1937, Chapter 101 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Montana Code S. 2089, 2090 .................... 28-29 
Office of Price Administration, Price Schedule No. 15 . . 5 
Office of Price Administration, Price Schedule No. 69 . . 5 
Office of Price Administration, Price Schedule No. 81 . . 5 
RCL, Vol. 25, Section 307 at p. 1092 ................ 19 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, 80-5-65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, 80-5-66 ............. 1-12-34 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, 80-5-67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, Title 81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
50 U. S. C. App. 901 to 946, pp. 313 to 349 . . . . . . . . . . 6 
U. S. C. A. Title 15, s 606b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
50 U. S. C. Appendix p. 314, Title V at p. 316 . . . . . . . . 7 
U. S. Cong. Serv. 1941, Vol. 9, pp. 852, 867 ......... 5-15 
Webster's New International Dictionary ........... 24-25 
Webster's New International Dictionary ............ 2'6 
In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
COMBINED METALS REDUCTION COMPANY 
EUREKA LILLY CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY 
TINTIC STANDARD MINING COMPANY 
COLORADO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY 
CHIEF CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY 
MONTANA BINGHAM CONSOLIDATED MINING 
COMPANY ........... . 
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STATE TAX COMMISSION and J. LAMBERT GIBSON, 
ROSCOE E. HAMMOND, MILTON TWITCHELL and 
HEBER BENNION, JR., constituting said Tax Commission. 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For convenience, and in order to conform with the 
plan adopted by Appellants, Respondents will refer herein 
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to the Record in Case No. 6869, Combined Metals Reduction 
Company v. State Tax Commission, et al. 
Appellants' "Statement of the Case" (Brief pp. 2-6) is 
inadequate for a clear understanding of the issues and 
omits facts which are not only material but, in view of the 
applicable statutes, are controlling. 
By Chapter 101, Laws of Utah, 1937, (Sections 80-5-65, 
et. seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1943), which became effec-
tive on May 11, 1937, the Legislature of Utah imposed a 
Mine Occupation Tax upon all persons engaged in the 
business of mining or producing metalliferous ores, and 
the Appellant, State Tax Commission, was empowered to 
administer that Act. Thereby, every person engaged in the 
business of mining or producing ore containing gold, silver, 
copper, lead, iron, zinc or other valuable metals in the 
State of Utah was required to pay to the State of Utah, 
"an occupation tax equal to one per cent of the gross amount 
received for, or the gross value of, metalliferous ore sold," 
during the calendar year then next preceding. Appellants 
(Brief, p. 3) refer to the above portion of the Mine Occupa-
tion Tax Act, but they apparently deem surplusage or quite 
unnecessary to a presentation of their case the provisions 
of that statute next below quoted, which provide the method 
by which the "gross amount received for, or gross value of, 
metalliferous ore sold" shall be determined. Section 80-5-66, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, after providing as above indi-
cated for the payment of an occupation tax equal to one per 
cent of the gross amount received for or the gross value 
of metalliferous ore sold specifically provides the basis 
for computing the occupation tax thereby imposed. 
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"THE BASIS FOR COMPUTING THE OC-
CUPATION TAX IMPOSED BY THIS ACT FOR 
ANY YEAR SHALL BE AS FOLLOWS: 
" (a) If the ore or metals extracted is sold 
under a bona fide contract of sale, the amount of 
money or its equivalent actually received by the 
owner, lessee, contractor or other person operating 
the mine or mining claim from the sale of all ores 
or metals during the calendar year less a reasonable 
cost, if any, of transporting the ore from the place 
where mined to the place where, under the contract 
of sale, the ore is to be delivered. 
"(b) If the extracted ore is treated at a 
mill, smelter or reduction works which receives ores 
from independent sources and which is owned or 
controlled by the same interest owning or controlling 
the mine or mining claim, such disposal shall be 
treated as a sale within the meaning of this section 
for the purpose of determining gross proceeds or 
otherwise, and in such determination a rate or charge 
for sampling, assaying, milling and smelting the 
ores and extracting the metals and minerals there-
from shall be deducted which shall not exceed an 
amount to be determined by applying the same rates 
as are applied by such mill, smelter, or reduction 
works or competing works, to ores of substantially 
like character and in like quantities received from 
independent sources. In the event of controversy 
the tax commission shall have power to determine 
such rates or charges. Transportation charges may 
also be deducted as provided in subdivision (a) 
hereof. 
"(c) If a mill or other reduction works is 
operated exclusively in connection with a mine, such 
mill or reduction works shall be treated as a part 
of the mine and the cost of operating such mill or 
reduction works shall, for the purpose of fixing the 
4 
occupation tax imposed by this act, be regarded as 
part of the cost of mining and cost of assaying, 
sampling, smelting, refining, and transportation, 
only, shall be deducted. 
"An annual exemption from the payment of 
the occupation tax imposed by this act upon $20,000 
in gross value of ore shall be allowed to each person, 
provided but one exemption shall be allowed for one 
claim or group of claims operating under one owner-
ship as a mine." 
Only sub paragraphs (a) and (b) supra of Section 
80-5-66 are involved here. 
It is further provided by the Act (Section 80-5-67, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943) that every person engaged 
in the business of mining shall file with the Appellant, 
State Tax Commission, a statement setting forth, among 
other things, "the total amount received during the preced-
ing calendar year from the sale of ore or metals," and the 
amount claimed by way of deduction for treatment charges 
and for transportation of the ores or metals sold "from the 
place where produced to the place sold." 
The sole inquiry here is as to the total amount received 
by the several Respondents from the sale of ore and metals 
during the calendar year 1943. 
The amount actually received by each Respondent dur-
ing the year 1943 from the sale of its ores and metals is set 
out in Column 1, page 31, of the stipulation of facts herein 
(Rec. p. 73). Appellants admit that no other or greater 
amounts were received from or paid by the purchaser. The 
amount of subsidies received by each Respondent during 
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that year is set out in Column 2 at the same page and the 
gross proceeds assessed by the Appellant commission, which 
include subsidy payments received from the Metals Reserve 
Company, is set out in Column 3 of the same page of the 
record. 
By Executive Order of the President No. 8734, pro-
mulgated April 11, 1941, as amended by the President's 
Executive Order No. 8875, promulgated August 28, 1941, 
(Vol. 9, U. S. Cong. Serv. 1941, pp. 852, 867) (R. 37-39) 
the President created in the Office for Emergency Manage-
ment of the Executive Office of the President, an Office 
of Price Administration, at the head of which the Presi·-
dent appointed an Administrator with authority to take all 
lawful steps necessary to prevent price spiralling and 
inflation, and among other things, to publish and declare 
maximum or ceiling prices of materials or commodities, 
and to enforce their observance. Pursuant to authority thus 
conferred, price schedules for copper were established 
August 12, 1941, (Price Schedule No. 15 by the Adminis-
trator, Office of Price Administration) (R. 39) and it was 
thereby provided, among other things, that no person should 
sell or offer to sell, buy or offer to buy, or accept delivery 
of copper at prices higher than the maximum of 12c per 
pound. And on January 13, 1942, the Administrator issued 
Price Schedule No. 69 (R. 42) which by provisions in large 
part identical with those of Schedule No. 15, fixed the 
maximum price for primary lead at 61;2c per pound; and 
on January 28, 1942, the Administrator issued Price Sched-
ule No. 81 (R. 43), which by provisions again in large part 
6 
identical with those of Price Schedule No. 15, fixed the 
maximum price for primary slab zinc at 8J.4c per pound. 
By Executive Order No. 9024 (Vol. 1 of Accu. Supp., 
Code of Fed. Reg. of the U. S. A., p. 1070) issued January 
16, 1942, the President created within the Office for 
Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the 
President, a War Production Board, and at the head of that 
Board appointed a chairman whom he empowered, with 
the advice and assistance of the members of the Board, 
to exercise general direction of the War Procurement and 
Production Program. And the War Production Board and 
the Office of Price Administration, by their joint declara-
tion, in the exercise of the powers of the President so con-
ferred upon them, defined copper, lead and zinc as strategic 
materials essential to the prosecution of the war. 
On January 30, 1942, the Emergency Price Control Act 
of 1942 became law (ch. 25, 56 Stat. 23; 50 U. S. C. App. 
901 to 946, pp. 313 to 349) and its Administrator was 
thereby empowered on behalf of the United States in such 
manner and upon such terms and conditions as he should 
determine to be necessary to obtain the maximum necessary 
production of any commodity, to make subsidy payments to 
domestic producers of such commodities in such amounts 
and in such manner and upon such terms and conditions 
as he should determine to be necessary to obtain such 
maximum necessary production thereof, provided that in 
the case of any commodity which had theretofore been or 
might thereafter be defined as strategic or critical by the 
President pursuant to Section 5d of the Reconstruction 
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Finance Corporation Act (15 U. S. C. A. s. 606b) as 
amended, such determination should be made by the Federal 
Loan Administrator with the President's approval, and 
such subsidy payments to domestic producers might be 
made only by corporations created or organized pursuant 
to Section 5d. Accordingly, the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation caused to be created as such agency of the 
United States a corporation known as Metals Reserve 
Company, and that company at all times since has served 
in that capacity. And the President of the United States 
made his Executive Order No. 9250 as amended by his 
Executive Order No. 9381 (50 U. S. C. Appendix, p. 314, 
Title V, at p. 316), and pursuant to the authority con-
ferred upon him by the Emergency Price Control Act of 
1942 created the Office of Economic Stabilization, and at 
the head of that office he established an Economic Stabili-
zation Director, and authorized that Director to direct 
Metals Reserve Company to use its authority to subsidize, 
were such measure necessary to insure the maximum neces-
sary production of any commodity. 
It being found that under the established price ceilings, 
costs to be encountered in the production of copper, lead 
and zinc and other metals essential to the successful prose-
cution of the war were too high to insure the maximum 
necessary production required for armament and other 
purposes of war, and copper, lead and zinc in such maxi-
mum necessary production being defined as indispensable 
and strategic material for that purpose, and stimulation 
of production of those metals being imperative and being 
possible by payment of a subsidy for such increased produc-
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tion, the National Government, impelled by the exigencies 
of war, paid and pays subsidies for production of these 
metals in excess of quotas established jointly by the War 
Production Board and the Office of Price Administration. 
The subsidies were and are being paid by order of the Office 
of Price Administration dated February 9, 1942, No. P. M. 
2458, and pursuant to that order, commencing February 
1, 1942, Metals Reserve Company has paid a subsidy for 
production, over and above fixed quotas of 5c per pound for 
copper, 2%c per pound for zinc, and 2%c per pound for lead. 
The cases here consolidated for presentation on appeal 
were tried before the lower court, as has above been 
indicated, upon a stipulation of facts. Among the facts 
stipulated to between the parties but omitted from Appel-
lants' "Statement" are the following: 
(a) "That none of the ore or metals produced 
from any mine of any plaintiff during said calendar 
year 1943 was sold by any plaintiff to the United 
States Government or to Metals Reserve Company 
or to any other agency of the United States Govern-
ment, but was sold to other purchasers." (R. p. 32.) 
(b) "That the sole controversy now remaining 
between the parties and the sole matter in issue to 
be submitted to and determined by the Court in 
each of said pending cases is whether or not, under 
the stipulated facts and pertinent statutory and 
and constitutional provisions, the payments made to 
plaintiff therein by Metals Reserve Company were 
a part of the gross amount received for, or the gross 
value of metalliferous ore sold and were lawfully 
considered and treated as such part in making the 
assessment and tax levy complained of." (R. p. 32.) 
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(c) Subsidies paid by Metals Reserve Com-
pany were not paid upon all ore produced by Re-
spondents but only upon production in excess of 
established quotas for the respective mines, (R. 
p. 47) and payments varied, certain Respondents 
receiving additional premiums where it appeared 
that the initial premiums offered for production in 
excess of established quotas were not sufficient to 
permit of increased production of copper, lead or 
zinc and that substantial expenditures were required 
for greatly increased development work and rehabili-
tation of underground workings or additional facili-
ties. 
(d) "Metals Reserve Company does not pur-
chase the ores on account of the production of which 
it pays premiums to the producer; they are not taken 
into account in tariffs filed by railways and approved 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission or Public 
Service Commission fixing freight rates on ores or 
concentrates and predicated primarily on metal 
value content; smelting companies may not partici-
pate in such premium payments even though their 
normal charges be based upon a sliding scale de-
pendent upon the value of the metal content of ores." 
(R. p. 61.) 
(e) That in certain instances subsidy pay-
ments were made by Metals Reserve Company to 
the producer in advance of the sale of ores or metals 
recovered from the ores, while in other instances 
such payments were made after the sale of the ores. 
In no instance did it appear that subsidy payments 
were or could have been made at the time of the 
sale of ores by the producer to the smelters or other 
purchaser. (R. pp. 61-62.) 
(f) That (R. p. 63) the mining companies 
caused to be prepared and submitted to Metals 
Reserve Company a memorandum respecting the 
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inclusion of premium payments in "net proceeds" 
and in "Mine Occupation Tax." After examining 
such memorandum a letter was written by the Presi-
dent of Metals Reserve Company to Mr. F. S. Mulock 
(General Manager, United States Smelting Refining 
and Mining Company). Such memorandum and 
letter were upon proper identification, received in 
evidence by the Commission, but it was agreed that 
the Commission should not be bound by the infer-
ences or conclusions therein stated; in that letter the 
President of the Metals Reserve Company said, 
"* * *, the statements in the memorandum with 
respect to premium payments by Metals Reserve 
Company, beginning with the final paragraph on 
page 2 and continuing to the end of the memorandum, 
are in our opinion, factually true and correct." (R. 
64.) 
The statements contained in the memorandum 
and so referred to as being factually true and correct 
are as follows : 
"Premium payments made by Metals Reserve 
Company are not payments made by that Company 
or received by the Mining Company for the sale or 
conversion into money or its equivalent of any ores: 
"Such premium payments are not realized from 
a sale; they are not paid by a purchaser (Metals 
Reserve Company does not purchase the ores upon 
account of which it makes premium payments) ; 
they are not paid at the time of a sale, nor are they 
based upon recoverable metals or actual recoveries 
at any particular concentrator or smelter, nor upon 
the terms of private settlement contracts; they are 
specifically exempted from the Excess Profits Tax; 
they are not taken into account in tariffs filed by 
railways and approved by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission or Public Service Commission fixing 
freight rates on ores or concentrates and predicated 
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primarily on metal value content; smelters may not 
participate in such payments even though their 
normal charges be based upon a sliding scale depend-
ent upon value of metal contents. 
"The announced purpose of premium payments 
was 'to expand output of copper, lead and zinc be-
cause of their importance in the production of arma-
ments', '* * * to compensate operators for extra 
costs involved for bringing out additional metal 
output,' '* * * to make it possible quickly to in-
crease production by mining low grade sub-marginal 
ores and to develop additional ore reserves.' (See 
OPA Release, February 9, 1942.) 
"Such purpose is emphasized by the order freez-
ing royalties and prohibiting diversion of any part 
of "B" and "C" quotas,-it being said that diversion 
of such added premiums into increased royalties to 
landowners would be 'an unwarranted expenditure 
of public funds which can contribute nothing to 
further production.' 
"To the extent that any portion of such prem-
iums are taken by a state on account of a property 
tax, the purpose of Metals Reserve Company in 
paying the same would be defeated and such funds 
be diverted from the use in the production of ores 
to a contribution to the support of state or local 
government.'' (R. pp. 66-67.) 
II 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Subsidy or Premium Payments Received by 
Respondents From Metals Reserve Company were No 
Part of the "Gross Amount Received For, Or Gross 
Value of Metalliferous Ore Sold.'' 
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Obviously the power to levy an occupation tax can only 
be exercised pursuant to an Act of the Legislature clearly 
prescribing the tax and a yardstick for determining its 
amount. If the yardstick employed is unsuitable, unfair 
or otherwise imperfect, the fault lies with the Legislature 
and cannot be corrected by the executive or judicial depart-
ments. A fairly wide discretion in selecting the yardstick 
is vested in the Legislature. In various states the occupation 
tax is determined from "Income," "Volume of Business 
Done," "Gross Earnings," "Gross Sales," etc. Occasionally 
the selected yardstick has been rejected by the courts as 
inappropriate. In such case the sole remedy has been and 
is a new and lawful statute supplied by the Legislature and 
not by a taxing agency of the executive department. 
At the top of page 3 of their brief, appellants correctly 
quote a portion of Section 80 .. 5-66, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, wherein it is provided that the occupation tax levied 
shall be "equal to one per cent of the gross amount received 
for, or the gross value of, metalliferous ore sold" during 
the calendar year then next preceding. 
Even if the quoted excerpt contained all of the provi-
sions of the section relating to the prescribed yardstick 
or pertinent to the question here presented for decision, 
it seems to us perfectly clear that the judgment of the trial 
court must be affirmed. Throughout Appellants' argu-
ments the significance of the word "sold" appearing in the 
quoted excerpt, is ignored. Were it assumed as contended 
by Appellants that the yardstick should have been "Income" 
or "Gross Proceeds" or "Gross Receipts" from any source, 
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the inescapable fact remains that the legislative department 
decreed otherwise in the quoted excerpt, even without the 
aid of the unquoted provisions of the section, which the 
Appellants have entirely disregarded. 
When the Legislature says in the quoted excerpt that 
the tax shall be "equal to one per cent of the gross amount 
received for, or the gross value of, metalliferous ore sold" 
it seems to us unmistakable that the levy must either be "one 
per cent of the gross amount received" under a bona fide 
contract for the "metalliferous ore sold" or "one per cent 
of the gross value of metalliferous ore sold." But were 
there any possible ambiguity in the quoted excerpt as to the 
yardstick to be applied the ambiguity is conclusively dis-
pelled by the portion of the section which appellants failed 
to quote but which we quote in our statement of facts and 
here repeat for convenience. 
"The basis for computing the occupation tax 
imposed by this act for any year shall be as follows: 
(a) If the ore or metals extracted is sold 
under a bona fide contract of sale the amount of 
money or its equivalent actually received by the 
owner, lessee, contractor or other person operating 
the mine or mining claim from the sale of all ores 
or metals during the calendar year less a reasonable 
cost, if any, of transporting the ore from the place 
where mined to the place where, under the contract 
of sale, the ore is to be delivered. 
(b) If the extracted ore is treated at a mill, 
smelter or reduction works which receives ores from 
independent sources and which is owned or con-
trolled by the same interests owning or controlling 
the mine or mining claim, such disposal shall be 
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treated as a sale within the meaning of this section 
for the purpose of determining gross proceeds or 
otherwise, and in such determination a rate or charge 
for sampling, assaying, milling and smelting the 
ores and extracting the metals and minerals there-
from shall be deducted which shall not exceed an 
amount to be determined by applying the same rates 
as are applied by such mill, smelter, or reduction 
works or competing works, to ores of substantially 
like character and in like quantities received from 
independent sources." 
There is no contention here that sales of ore were made 
other than bona fide and no contention that any erroneous 
computation was made with respect to the sale of the ores 
the determination of the value of which is covered by sub-
divisions (a) and (b) of the statute above quoted. 
There is nothing unconstitutional or otherwise unlaw-
ful in the express mandate of the Legislature prescribing 
the basis for computing the occupation tax which is to be 
paid. The prescribed methods of computing the tax are not 
given in the statute by way of example but are exclusive and 
conclusive. 
In view of the fact that it is here stipulated that "Metals 
Reserve Company does not purchase the ores on account 
of the production of which it pays premiums to the pro-
ducer" it is not only difficult but impossible to understand 
how the premium or subsidy payments could be properly 
included in "the amount of money or its equivalent actually 
received * * * from the sale of * * * ore or metals 
* * * " 
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In an effort seemingly to bring the subsidy payments 
within the purview of the mining occupation tax statute, 
Appellants imply that the subsidy payments made by 
Metals Reserve Company were made as, and were, part of 
the purchase price for which the metals were sold. The 
trouble with that contention is that it has no basis in fact. 
Metals Reserve Company made the subsidy payments, but 
it neither bought the ores nor did it have a contract to buy 
them, nor did it acquire any interest in the ores or metals 
sold. It did not pay any part of the purchase price of the 
ores or metals sold. The consideration for the sale of the 
ores and metals was paid by the purchasers and no one else, 
and was paid at or about the time of sale which bore no 
relation whatever to the payment of the subsidies. Subsidy 
payments were received by the smelters as agents for the 
Metals Reserve Company and were distributed to the pro-
ducer, sometimes before and sometimes after the purchase 
of the ores and payment therefor, but never contemporan-
eously therewith, and in many cases not by the same smelter 
that purchased all of the producer's ores. 
The ceiling prices constitute the sole consideration paid 
by the purchasers for all ores or metal sold, and the pro-
ducers are denied by law the right to sell or offer to sell 
buy, or offer to buy, or to accept, delivery of copper, lead 
or zinc at prices higher than the stated maximums of 12c 
per pound for copper, 6.5c per pound for lead and 8.25c per 
pound for zinc. (Executive Order No. 8734 as amended by 
Executive Order No. 8875 Vol. 9. U. S. Cong. Serv. 1941, 
pp. 852,867; Rec. pp. 39, 40, 42 and 43.) 
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While railroad freight rates are based on the value of 
ore shipped it is stipulated herein (R. p. 61) that subsidy 
payments are never included in determination of the value 
upon which the freight rates are based; nor may smelting 
companies participate in such premium payments even 
though their charges are based upon a sliding scale depend-
ent upon the metal value of the ores (R. 61). 
There is a fundamental distinction between proceeds 
realized from a sale of ore and a subsidy paid by the 
Government for over-quota production. The difference is 
not of degree but of character and purpose. Bouvier defines 
a sale as "an agreement by which one of two contracting 
parties, called the seller, gives the thing and passes the title 
to it, in exchange for a certain price in current money, to 
the other party, who is called the buyer or purchaser, who, 
on his part, agrees to pay such price." 
We have substantially the same definition in Title 81, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, which deals with "Sales." 
There must be a seller and a buyer. The buyer is the one 
who receives the goods and is bound to pay the price. 
Subsidies or bounties have nothing to do with the value 
of the goods produced or the services performed. They are 
given purely and simply for the promotion of the public 
welfare. 
The bounty paid for the killing of a wolf or a coyote 
has nothing to do with the market price of the hide. The 
value of the article produced and the bounty paid for its 
production are two separate and distinct things. So in this 
case the subsidy or bounty paid by the government is paid 
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without regard to the intrinsic value of the metals. It is 
paid because the exigencies of war demand it, that there 
may be brought into existence in sufficient quantities metals 
that are critically essential to the prosecution of the war. 
Different operators not only have been assigned differ-
ent quotas on the same metals, thus establishing a variety 
of bases upon which the subsidies are paid, but the sub-
sidies themselves vary in amount, being A or A and B or 
A, B and C subsidies according to the circumstances peculiar 
to each producer. Thus were the subsidy payments to be 
included as a part of the receipts from sales or as a part 
of the value of the ores or metals sold, there would be almost 
as many sales prices or values for the same metals sold as 
there would be producers. An utter lack of uniformity or 
equality would prevail, for though two operators produce 
identical quantities of the same metal, sell it on the open 
market for an identical sum, one, because of the difference 
in quotas, or the class of subsidies assigned, or both, would 
be called upon to pay a tax and the other not, or the rate 
of taxation would differ between them, although the pro-
duct sold were identical, an incongruous situation to result 
from application of a fiction not within contemplation of 
the mining occupation tax of Utah. 
To permit the construction contended for by appel-
lants the mandate of the Utah statute that the occupation 
tax levied shall be "equal to one per cent of the gross 
amount received for, or the gross value of, metalliferous ore 
sold" must be supplemented so that the required levy shall 
be "equal to one per cent of the gross amount received for, 
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or the gross value of, metalliferous ore sold, plus one per 
cent of any subsidies paid by the United States Government 
for producing metals vital to the war effort in excess of 
a fixed quota." The fact that when the statute was enacted 
there were no quotas, no subsidy payments, and not even 
a war does not seem to trouble appellants in arriving at 
their conclusion that the Legislature clearly read the future 
and had especially in mind the levy of an occupation tax 
on any rewards for extra effort that might be offered by the 
Government during times of national peril. 
It must always be kept in mind that the tax here in 
question is an occupation tax-not an income tax. Each 
respondent has already made full payment of its income tax. 
In arriving at the amount of such tax all subsidy payments 
received by any respondent were properly included as a part 
of its income. 
In the suits at bar it would appear unnecessary to call 
attention to the elementary principle stated in United States 
v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179,44 S.C. 69,68 L. Ed. 240, that: 
"-in statutes levying taxes the literal meaning 
of the words employed is most important, for such 
statutes are not to be extended by implication be-
yond the clear import of the language used. If the 
words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved 
against the government and in favor of the tax-
payer.--" 
Miller v. Standard Nut Ma,rgarine Co., 284 U. 
S. 498, 52 S. C. 260, 76 L. Ed. 422; 
Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 38 S. C. 53, 62 
L. Ed. 211. 
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The Supreme Court of Utah enunciated the same prin-
ciple with equal clarity in Norville v. State Tax Commission, 
98 Utah 170, 97 P. (2d) 937, 126 A. L. R. 1318, as follows: 
"-in seeking to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature the court will adopt that interpretation 
of a taxing statute which lays the tax burden uni-
formly on all standing in the same degree with rela-
tion to the tax adopted. --And will avoid an inter-
pretation which would lead to an impractical, un-
fair, or unreasonable result. --" 
The doctrine that taxing statutes are, in case of doubt 
as to the intention of the legislature, to be construed 
strictly against the taxing authority and in favor of those 
on whom the tax is levied, has been well set out in the 
case of Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. 
S. 84, 55 S. Ct. 50, 79 L. Ed. 211. See, also, Los Angeles 
& S. L. R. Co. v. Richards, 52 Utah 1, 172 P. 474; 
W. F. Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 90 Utah 
359, 61 P. 2d 629, 107 A. L. R. 261; 25 R. C. L. Sec. 307 
at p. 1092; Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 11, 4th Ed. Sec. 503 
at p. 1113. 
Under the statutes and authorities and on every basis 
of reason and logic, it is submitted that the subsidies are 
bonuses paid by the United States as a bounty to encourage 
production of copper, lead and zinc, and may not be con-
sidered as a part of the gross amount received for, or the 
gross value of, ores sold. 
Appellants in their brief have erroneously made cer-
tain statements to which we wish here to call attention. 
At the bottom of page 8, it is stated that the producer 
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would receive the ceiling price for their ores from the 
smelters to which they were shipped and at the same time 
would receive from Metals Reserve Company from the very 
same smelter the premium payments for their ores produced 
in excess of his quota. As stipulated, such payments were 
not made at the same time and frequently not by the same 
smelter. Where a producer shipped all ores to one smelter, 
premium payments were made through that smelter, but 
where a producer shipped to more than one smelter he 
selected the smelter through which he would receive pre-
mium payments. 
At page 10, under paragraph numbered 9, it is stated 
that in order to relieve the mining companies from the pro-
visions of the ceiling price schedules, the Office of Price Ad-
ministration issued its supplementary regulation No. 4, ex-
empting from such ceiling prices, sales or deliveries of cop-
per, lead or zinc to Metals Reserve Company or to its duly 
authorized agent or agents, pursuant to the premium price 
plan. It is not clear whether Appellants intend to suggest 
that this order permitted smelting companies individually 
purchasing copper, lead or zinc to pay more than the ceiling 
price for such metals because they had been designated by 
Metals Reserve Company as its agents for certain purposes 
but not for the purpose of purchasing such ores or whether 
this statement is made for some other purpose. In any 
event it has been stipulated as herein shown that the ores 
were sold at the ceiling prices, were sold to the smelters 
and that the subsidy payments came from the Metals Re-
serve Company which did not purchase the ores. 
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At page 20 it is stated that the smelters are made the 
agents of the Federal Government for the purpose of re-
ceiving the ores and paying the premium prices and that 
the producers are required to dispose of the ores at the 
designated smelters before the premium prices will be paid. 
The smelters are not designated as agents for the purpose 
of receiving ores and the producers were not required to 
dispose of their ores to any designated smelters. The pro-
ducer selects the smelters to which he wishes to ship and 
when he ships to more than one smelter designates through 
which smelter he will receive premiums from Metals Re-
serve Company. The purpose of this requirement by Metals 
Reserve Company was obviously to avoid the possibility 
of duplication in premium payments. 
At pages 12, 28, 29 and elsewhere in their brief Appel-
lants state that it was held by the trial court and that it 
has been urged by Respondents that the subsidy payments 
were mere gifts. The court made no such statement, nor 
is it anywhere urged by Respondents. This statement is 
apparently made by Appellants for the purpose of tying 
their argument to certain income tax cases cited by them 
in which it has been held that receipts claimed by taxpayers 
to be gifts were nevertheless income under the income tax 
statutes. Those cases are irrelevant here since we are 
not concerned with income but with an occupation tax the 
basis of computing which is specifically provided for in the 
Act which creates the tax. 
The case of Vause etc. v. McKibbin, 39 N. E. (2d) 1006 
referred to by Appellants at pages 13 to 16 of their brief 
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is irrelevant. That case involved a retail sales tax based 
upon "Gross Receipts" and it was held that the retailer 
must pay his tax upon $1.03 where he priced the article at 
$1.00 but received in payment therefor $1.03, the additional 
3c being designated, as between the retailer and consumer, 
a payment of tax. Our court in the case of Dupler Art Furs 
v. State Ta.x Commission,-- Utah--, 161 P. (2d) 788, 
has just held the opposite under our sales tax act which 
defines purchase price as the price to the consumer, ex-
clusive of tax. In that case Judge Larson said "I concur 
in the holding that the term 'purchase price' upon which 
our state sales tax is computed, is the price the purchaser 
pays not including the said luxury tax. In other words the 
Federal luxury tax is excluded from the purchase price 
in computing the state sales tax." 
The Minnesota case of State v. Armson, --Minn.--
207 N. W. 732, relied on by Appellants, involved an occupa-
tion tax statute where the purchaser paid in advance of 
delivery and took a discount. The Court held that the dis-
count represented interest on money paid before it was 
due rather than an allowance on the purchase price. 
The cases of Me1·cur Gold Mining Company v. Spry, 
16 Utah 222, 52 Pac. 352 and Salt Lake County v. Utah 
Copper Company, 294 Fed. 199, cited at page 17 of Appel-
lants' brief did not involve the statute or the problem pre-
sented here and are irrelevant, and as stated, supra, if our 
statute used the words "gross income," "gross earnings" or 
other phrases such as those relied upon by Appellants but 
different from those actually used, or if an income tax prob-
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lem was involved, the other cases relied upon by Appellants 
might be enlightening. 
The only case in which the problem here presented has 
come before a court of last resort in any state is the case 
of Klies v. Linnane (Mont.) decided February 26, 1945, 
and reported at 156 P. (2d) 183 wherein the Montana 
Supreme Court held that subsidies identical with those here 
involved were not properly to be included in the "gross 
value" of the miner's product to arrive at the valuation of 
net proceeds of mines for the purpose of taxation, saying, 
(156 P. (2d) 185) : 
"(1) It is, therefore, clear that in the determin-
ation of the 'valuation of the net proceeds of such 
mines and mining claims for the purpose of taxation,' 
S. 2091, Revised Codes, the gross value of the pro-
duct, which is the basis for computation, is the 
money which the producer received or should pro-
perly have received upon the bona fide sale of his 
product. The question here is whether the premium 
or bonus received from the government, which was 
not the purchaser of the ores or metals, should be 
considered as constituting a part of the gross value, 
or of the proceeds of bona fide sale, of plaintiff's 
products. 
"Title 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix S 902 (e), which 
is a part of the Emergency Price Control Act, pro-
vides: 'Whenever the Administrator determines that 
the maximum necessary production of any com-
modity is not being obtained or may not be obtained 
during the ensuing year, he may, on behalf of the 
United States, * * * make subsidy payments to 
domestic producers of such commodity in such 
amounts and in such manner and upon such terms 
and conditions as he determines to be necessary to 
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obtain the maximum necessary production thereof: 
Provided, That in the case of any commodity which 
has heretofore or may hereafter be defined as a 
strategic or critical material by the President pur-
suant to section 5d of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation Act (section 609j of Title 15) as 
amended, such determinations shall be made by the 
Federal Loan Administrator, with the approval of 
the President, and notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of this Act (sections 901-946 of this Appen-
dix) or of any existing law * * * such subsidy 
payments to domestic producers thereof may be paid, 
only by corporations created or organized pursuant 
to such section 5d (section 609j of Title 15) ; * * *" 
"(2) The Metals Reserve Company was created 
for the purposes mentioned in those federal acts. 
It encourages the increased production of strategic 
metals, including lead and zinc, by paying the pro-
ducer a premium or bonus for such production in 
excess of a quota fixed by it for that producer. In 
this connection two points should be noted. The 
Metals Reserve Company does not thereby increase 
the price of the metal, or the amount to be paid by 
the purchaser for the ·metal ; nor does it pay the 
premium or bonus upon all the production, but only 
upon the production in excess of the defined quota. 
Thus, as intended by the federal statute, it is not 
production, but increased production, which is en-
couraged. 
"Webster's New International Dictionary de-
fines 'bonus' as a 'subsidy to an industry from a 
government.' It defines 'sudsidy' as a 'grant of funds 
or property from a government, * * * to a private 
person or company to assist in the establishment or 
support of an enterprise deemed advantageous to 
the public.' It is an artificial way of encouraging an 
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industry or enterprise otherwise than by increasing 
the value of its product. 
"It is apparent that under natural economic 
laws the production of lead and zinc ores, as well 
as of other products, automatically results when-
ever economically practicable, and that it cannot 
ordinarily result unless so. Production not otherwise 
practicable may artificially be made so, either by 
increasing the price of the product, or by rewarding 
the production otherwise, as by subsidy or bonus 
payment. An essential difference between the two 
methods is that a direct price increase ordinarily 
not only rewards and thus encourages additional 
production, but also makes more profitable the pro-
duction which would have existed without it; on the 
other hand, the subsidy or bonus method can more 
practicably be limited in application to the additional 
production. Either method would tend to increase 
the production of strategic metals for war purposes 
by making profitable an enterprise which otherwise 
could not pay its way, and, therefore, could not 
operate. Both methods increase the proceeds, and 
therefore the value of the enterprise by making it 
profitable, but only the price rise method increases 
the value of the product. Thus they are similar only 
in increasing the income from, and the value of 
the enterprise. 
"(3) Defendant argues in his brief that 'al-
though the premium or bonus is paid as an induce-
ment to increase production of strategic metals, its 
effect is to increase the value of such metals to plain-
tiffs.' But its effect is not to increase the value of 
the metals to plaintiffs or anyone else, for it does 
not change the prices at which they are bought and 
sold. Defendant fails to distinguish between the 
enterprise, the profits and value of which are in-
creased by the bonus or subsidy, and the product 
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itself, the value of which is not thus increased. The 
killing of bear for bearskins and the production of 
beets for sugar may not be profitable enterprises. 
They may be made profitable by a bounty on the 
killing of bear or the raising of beets, but it cannot 
be said that such bounty increases the value of the 
bearskins or the sugar. It is the enterprise, not the 
product, which has been increased in value. But 
the tax upon the net proceeds of mines is not based 
upon the value of the enterprise, nor upon all possible 
income therefrom. It is based only upon the net 
value of the ores produced. Income in addition to 
that received as the net value of the product may 
perhaps be taxable as income, but it is clearly not 
taxable as 'net proceeds of mines' which the statute 
identifies as the net value of the product and bases 
upon the gross proceeds of its bona fide sale. 
"Webster's New International Dictionary de-
fines 'value' as a 'fair return in money, goods, 
services, etc., for something exchanged; that which 
is considered an equivalent in worth; * * * mone-
tary worth of a thing, marketable price; also, worth 
as estimated in terms of a currency or of another 
medium of exchange.' 
"A further examination of the premium or 
bonus system employed demonstrates the fallacy of 
defendant's argument that it is the value of the 
product which is increased. The Metals Reserve 
Company has instituted a double premium for zinc 
production. Under it the normal quota may reflect 
a normal price of 11c per pound. A certain excess 
production may receive a bonus of 2%c per pound, 
while still further excess production may receive 
an additional bonus of that amount. Thus the zinc 
production of a certain mine, all of which is sold 
on the market at its value of approximately llc per 
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pound, may under the quota system be additionally 
rewarded by a bonus of 23,4c per pound upon part of 
the excess and by a bonus of 5%c per pound upon 
the remainder. But can it be said that this zinc, all 
of it precisely the same, varies in value so that some 
of it is worth llc, some 133/l,c, and some 161f2c per 
pound? Obviously, the increase, is not in the value 
of the product but in the income, profitableness and 
value of the enterprise, upon which the tax in ques-
tion is not based. The additional income is from a 
collateral or additional source, not included in the 
tax base. 
"Defendant argues further that the premium 
or bonus plan is part of the emergency price control 
system, that the effect of that system is to prevent 
the ascertainment of value in a free market, and 
that the bonus, together with the sale price, should 
therefore be considered as the equivalent of that 
value. But, as noted above, the value, however fixed, 
is the price paid and received for the metal, and 
other reward, incentives or incidental income are 
not part of that value; they are therefore not part 
of the tax base. 
"Defendant cites section 1996, subdivision 5, 
which defines both 'value' and 'full cash value' as 
meaning for taxation purposes 'the amount at which 
the property would be taken in payment of a just 
debt due from a solvent debtor,' and asks: 'Would 
anybody seriously assert that if plaintiffs in this 
case had owed a creditor $217,876.68 that creditor 
would not have been eager and willing to take plain-
tiffs' total production of metals, including zinc and 
lead, for what they could be sold for in the market 
plus the bonus which the Metals Reserve Company 
was willing to pay as a bonus or premium for pro-
ducing them?' The question must be answered con-
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trary to defendants' apparent view for the Metals 
Reserve Company would not pay the bonus to the 
creditor or other purchaser, but only to the producer. 
"It is apparent, therefore, that the premium or 
bonus paid by the government, not as part of a pur-
chase price for the product, but as an inducement 
for its production, is not a part of the value of the 
product." 
Appellants in their brief on page 36 attempt very 
briefly to distinguish the Montana statutes involved in the 
case of Klies v. Linnane, and then divert to refer to a Mon-
tana Occupation tax statute which wasn't involved in that 
case. 
As a matter of fact the Montana statutes involved in 
the Klies case were conceivably susceptible of the inter-
pretation which Appellants are asking the Court to place 
on our occupation tax statute, for although the language 
of the Montana provisions was properly construed in the 
Klies case as meaning what is espressly stated in the pertin-
ent provisions of the Utah statute, the language there 
employed might by some stretch of the imagination make 
plausible a contention that subsidy payments were there 
intended to be included and treated as a part of the net 
annual proceeds of Montana mines. Under Sections 2089 
and 2090 of the Montana Code, the mine owner is required 
to report "the gross yield" from his mine, and "the gross 
yield or value in dollars and cents" less specified deductions 
determines the assessment upon which the tax levy must 
rest. Unlike the Utah statute, the assessment is not express-
ly and unmistakably based upon and tied to the "gross 
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amount received for or the gross value of metalliferous ore 
sold." The Montana statute, unlike the Utah statute, does 
not expressly say that the "gross yield" of minerals pro-
duced shall be confined to "the gross amount received for 
or the gross value of metalliferous ore sold" and does not 
thus expressly exclude any "yield" or income derived from 
other sources than a "sale." In holding that the Montana 
statutes necessarily imply what the Utah statutes expressly 
provide, the Supreme Court of that State merely adopted 
a commonsense construction of what must have been in-
tended by the Montana Legislature. The Utah statutes 
leave no possible room for a contention like that unsuccess-
fully urged by the Montana County Treasurer. 
With reference to Appellants' argument that the value 
of the product was increased because of subsidy payments, 
the decision of the Montana Court as above set out is 
pertinent. Moreover the ancient law of supply and demand 
still operates. Under that law the "value" of bear skins, 
metals, or of any o'ther property cannot be increased by 
increasing the supply. The rule holds good in times of 
depression, in war or in peace. The announced purpose 
and the achieved purpose of the subsidy program was to 
increase 'the supply of metals vital to the war. What might 
have been the sale price or value of the metals in the 
absence of a ceiling price is problematical. What was the 
value and the top sale price of the metals involves no 
possible uncertainty. Under the stipulated facts and pur-
suant to valid contracts of sale, each Respondent sold its 
metals at the top price. 
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The weakness of a contention that subsidy payments 
had any relationship to value is apparent from the fact 
that a pound of lead, copper or zinc produced by a Respond-
ent before it had exceeded its quota and another pound 
of the same metal produced after it had exceeded its quota 
would be identical in weight, kind and character and on any 
market would necessarily sell for the same price and be of 
identical value. 
At page 29 of their brief Appellants accurately state 
with reference to the nature of the subsidies: 
"The quid pro quo for which such premium payments 
were made, was the actual production of the various 
metals * * * ." 
The concluding part of the sentence that said production 
was "for the Federal Government in the prosecution of the 
war" may be true in part. Although the record is silent 
as to the ultimate consumer of any products sold by any 
Respondent, that consumer may in some instances have been 
a government agency. But regardless of who may have 
received all or any part of any ore or metals sold, appellants 
necessarily deny their contention that the premium pay-
ments were a part "of the gross amount received for or the 
gross value of the metalliferous ore sold" when they say 
on page 29 of their brief, as to the nature of these pay-
ments: 
"The premium payments were made for production 
of ore * * * ." 
If and when the Government or one of its agencies 
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received and used for the war effort a quantity of metal 
produced by a Respondent on a portion of which premium 
payments had been made and on the remainder of which 
no premium payment had been made because Respondent 
has not then exceeded his quota, pursuant to what definition 
of value and by what process of reasoning would anyone 
say that a pound of metal for the production of which no 
premium had been paid had a different or a less value than 
an identical pound of the same metai produced after 
Respondent had exceeded its quota? 
2. The Exaction of the Tax Herein Complained of was a 
Direct and Unconstitutional Interference with and 
Burden upon the Functions of the National Govern-
ment. 
In view of the statute and the stipulated facts, we 
see no occasion to impose upon the time of the court with 
a detailed discussion of constitutional questions; neverthe-
less to permit the state to take under the occupation tax 
any part of the premium payments made by Metals Reserve 
Company would constitute a direct and unlawful burden 
upon the National Government. As indicated above the 
chairman of Metals Reserve Company approved the state-
ment that "To the extent that any portion of such premiums 
are taken by a state on account of a property tax the pur-
pose of Metals Reserve Company in paying the same would 
be defeated and such funds be diverted from use in the 
production of ores to a contribution to the support of state 
or local government." 
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"A state cannot interfere with the free and unem-
barassed exercise by the Federal government of all power 
conferred upon it." 51 Am. Juris., Taxation, Sec. 218, p. 
279; 11 Am. Juris., p. 870, Constitutional Law, Section 174. 
"It necessarily follows that a state and the subordinate 
taxing units thereof are without power to subject to taxa-
tion the property of the Federal government or the means, 
instrumentalities and agencies thereof which it employs 
to carry out its proper functions, unless Congress expressly 
confers a right upon the states to tax such agencies, in-
strumentalities or property." 51 Am. Juris., p. 279, Taxa-
tion, Sec. 218. 
"The state may not burden or interfere with the 
exercise of national power or make it a source of revenue, 
or tax things sold, or tax the means used, for the perform-
ance of federal functions." 51 Am. Juris., p. 279, Taxa-
tion, Sec. 218. 
The tax is neither indirect nor remote. It is a reduction 
by the state of the special allowances Congress has directed 
to be paid to successfully conduct a war. 
The doctrine upon this subject originates from the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
McCulloch v. State of Maryland, et al., 17 U. S. 159, 4 
Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579. Chief Justice Marshall in the 
opinion said : 
"The sovereignty of a state extends to everything 
which exists by its own authority, or is introduced 
by its permission; but does it extend to those mean.~ 
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which are employed by congress to carry into execu-
tion powers conferred on that body by the people 
of the United States?" 
Appellants rely upon such cases as: 
.James V. Dravo Contra.cting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 82 
L. Ed. 155; and Alabama v. King and Boozer, 
314 U. S. 1, 86 L. Ed. 3, 
which were efforts to tax private property of an individual 
as salary, contractor's profits, or the like. But this is not 
such a case. The effort here is actually to take away 
a part of these special allowances paid by the National 
Government to further the prosecution of the war. The 
tax involved in the suit at bar falls directly and immedi-
ately upon an operation of the National Government, and 
upon the very means employed by the National Government 
for the exercise of its powers. 
As stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Johnson v. Mary-
land, 254 U.S. 51, 55; 41 S. Ct. 16; 65 L. Ed. 126, 128: 
"With regard to taxation, no matter how reason-
able, or how universal and undiscriminating, the 
state's inability to interfere has been regarded as 
established since M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 
316, 4 L. Ed. 579. The decision in that case was not 
put upon any consideration of degree, but upon the 
entire absence of power on the part of the states to 
touch, in that way, at least, the instrumentalities of 
the United States ( 4 Wheat. 429, 430), and that is 
the law today." 
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III 
CONCLUSION 
The application of Section 80-5-66 Utah Code An-
notated 1943, to the facts stipulated herein clearly makes 
the consideration of other contentions or arguments unneces-
sary. That statute not only levies the tax but definitely 
and precisely prescribes the yardstick by which the amount 
of the tax is to be measured. 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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